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JANUARY 2005
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- What Can Foreign Industrial-goods Suppliers Learn From Foreign Consumer Brands in China?
- Investigation of Audits Reveals Unjustified Preferential Treatment Still Exists Among State-owned Enterprises (SOEs)
- M & A in China
- Case Study: Conversion of a Failed State-owned Enterprise (SOE) to a Successful Wholly-owned Foreign Enterprise (WOFE)
For previous Issues
www.fiducia-china.com
Publisher
Fiducia Management
Consultants
Press Contact:
Jellis Kan
info@fiducia-china.com
All liabilities excluded. This Newsletter is based on information obtained from sources (government,
business associates, companies, publications, etc.) believed to be reliable.
However Fiducia Management Consultants does not make representations as to it's
accuracy, completeness or correctness.
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| What Can Foreign Industrial-goods Suppliers Learn From Foreign Consumer Brands in China? |
Although the brand hype surrounding consumer goods cannot
be compared with the brand power of industrial goods, the cost structures of
Chinese companies compared to those of foreign players are similar. No matter
that the company is a German multinational with extensive networks in China, or
a Spanish SME (small-medium enterprise) exporting to China; each is challenged
by domestic price competition. At the same time, Chinese companies are
increasing their product quality and closing the gap on the sometimes more
technologically advanced foreign players. In view of the struggle of
industrial-goods companies with market expansion in China, it is advisable to
look at consumer brands, which entered the Chinese market decades ago. Some
lessons to be learned include the following:
1. Position yourself in the premium segment - right at the top.
In recent years, many foreign players have faced the problem of being positioned
at the top end of a market, which meant losing market volume in the lower-price
segments to cheaper Chinese competition. In highly competitive markets, some
foreign players decided to position themselves in the low to medium end to scoop
up market share. Now though, they have no alternative but to pull out of what
has been for them a loss-making segment. For example, consumer electronic brands
such as Panasonic, Samsung and LG are realising Chinese competition will
probably always benefit from cost advantages, and in the medium to long term win
the battle for the base of the customer-segment pyramid. The escape plan
consists of cementing a frontier where Chinese competition is weak, which
normally means the premium-brand segment. Companies should not risk the
depreciation of their premium brands at any time or level.
2. Reveal your roots the right way.
Being foreign can be an advantage in Chinese markets, at least in gaining a
small head start. Although there are powerful domestic brands in China, buyers
often have less trust in those brands than in foreign products. However, it is
dangerous to assume that trust can easily be transformed into loyalty.
Owning a foreign brand does not imply any automatic, favourable regard from
customers and purchasing-decision makers. Japanese consumer goods companies
normally avoid associating their brand with their country of origin owing to the
difficult past between China and Japan. Sony has set an example by establishing
a “dynamic”, “young” and “positive” image, which enabled it to overtake
Panasonic in terms of brand power in China in 2004.
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JANUARY 2005
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In the electrical-fittings industry, some Chinese companies are assuming foreign
“identities” by including foreign nationalities in their names, or by
registering shell companies in Europe. For example, the T & J Group, a Chinese
manufacturer of sockets and switches with a Shenzhen factory and an extensive
sales network in China, uses its British representative office registration as
camouflage to create a “foreign-invested” brand image. This has enabled T & J to
copy the brand image of foreign producers and to position itself between foreign
premium brand products and lower-priced Chinese items.
The communication of the concept of superior quality owing to origin remains in
today’s markets in China. It is particularly prevalent in industrial-goods
industries such as the manufacture and supply of precision technology and
medical instruments.
3. Establish a second brand in the medium- to low-end market segments.
Even when a foreign brand is positioned to aim for the top end of a market, the
low end to medium end of that market (which often achieves double-digit growth
rates) is not necessarily lost, but can be tapped with a second brand, for
example by acquiring an important Chinese player. Cosmetics giant L’Oreal bought
Mininurse in December 2003, a local brand aimed at China’s low-end cosmetics
market, and Yue-Sai in January 2004, a well-positioned Chinese cosmetics brand
with a manufacturing plant in Shanghai and a distribution network of 800 stores
in 240 Chinese cities. An exogenous growth strategy seems to be the only way for
L’Oreal China to boost sales of USD 200 million in 2003 to a projected target of
USD 500 million by 2007.
Not only in the consumer-goods industry, but also in the industrial-goods
industry, foreign manufacturers are increasingly investigating the second-brand
option as they become more aware that Chinese competition is aggressively
scooping up market share. Foreign companies, however, often lack the know-how
and the necessary capital for further expansion, so acquiring firms from among
their top 10 Chinese competitors has become an important strategic
consideration.
4. Beat Chinese competition where it is weak: Standards and Process Control.
In fast-growing regional markets, Chinese consumer-goods brands in the snack,
food and household-appliance markets are highly vulnerable to destabilising
rumours. E-mails or mobile-phone messages rapidly spread disinformation about
brands that proves harmful. Chinese companies are mostly unprepared for handling
such issues, and fail to communicate the problems. Owing to the rapid changes in
and growth of markets, there is no time to react to protect brands when rumours
arise. Nor do foreign companies remain unaffected: in September 2004, Carrefour
outlets in Shanghai and Hangzhou supposedly sold fake Maotai, the most famous
Chinese alcohol. As far as the average consumer was concerned, and thanks to
negative chatter, Carrefour’s image was sullied.
Because Chinese companies often struggle to ensure the quality of their
products, foreign companies have an advantage when implementing strict
quality-control measures. Standards must be controlled everywhere, at all times,
by industrial-goods producers, even if this causes higher overheads compared to
those faced by their Chinese competitors. Further, foreign players with advanced
technology can influence the creation of new industry benchmarks. For example,
in the construction industry it is often easier for foreign firms, together with
the Chinese government, to create new standards than to influence existing
standards.
5. Services can be your ultimate competitive advantage.
In China, sustainable brands are often built by personal interaction with
consumers rather than anonymous mass campaigns. Fujitsu and Microsoft, for
example, undertook face-to-face marketing campaigns in Shanghai to cut through
the maze of advertising. For consumer-goods manufacturers, personal services
have become more important than ever as a point of differentiation and in
establishing long-term relationships with customers.
When, in the view of the Chinese customer, the product quality gap is closing
and the Chinese product is still 30 per cent cheaper than the foreign brand, the
foreign player may find he has exhausted his competitive capabilities. Another
option for differentiation from the competition is normally the service provided
to the customer. However, the main dilemma for smaller foreign players is the
lack of a service network in China.
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Chinese agents can provide after-sales service, but require intensive and
expensive training. Such agents must also be supervised closely to ensure they
do not put the company’s brand and reputation at risk. Further, a foreign
company might not want to give proprietary technology to a third party. And
services for complex products, for example machine-tool machining centres, can
be costly when European service technicians must be flown in.
The most straightforward solution to these problems is to define carefully the
region to be served and set up a service centre or representative office in the
area. This, of course, also depends on identifying the precise region where the
business potential for the respective product is most promising.
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| Investigation of Audits Reveals Unjustified Preferential Treatment Still Exists Among State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) |
To improve scrutiny of Stated-owned Enterprises (SOEs),
the Statistics and Evaluation Bureau recently investigated the audits of the 181
largest Chinese state-owned companies, such as Sinopec, China Telecom and Air
China. The director of the government-controlled authority, Meng Jianmin,
announced the following findings in the Beijing Times on 8 January 2005.
Figure – Results of the investigation of
audits of state-owned firms.
The alarming results showed that only five of the 181
audits were correct; 13 included “blatant lies”. The remaining 163 were
incomplete, insufficient or had significant technical problems with their
auditing methods. More than 300 agencies carried out the audits in a
haphazard manner. Some, fearing withholding of payment, or potential
disadvantages accruing from any meticulous investigation of governmental
concerns, even wrote falsified re-ports.
Although the Statistics and Evaluation Bureau operates under the state-owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, the results of this
investigation do not gloss over the fact that SOEs still enjoy a jester’s licence.
The problems revealed may be the tip of the iceberg, but are a promising step
to-wards a scenario in which state-owned firms obey laws and market forces, as
do private companies, in the relatively near future.
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| M & A in China |
o On 4 January, CapitaLand Retail China Pte. Ltd., a
wholly owned subsidiary of CapitaLand Ltd., entered into a cooperative agreement
with Beijing Hualian Group Investment Holding Co. Ltd., one of the largest
retailers in China. The agreement is to acquire two retail malls located in
Beijing, namely Anzhen Shopping Mall and Wangjing Shopping Mall, for USD 210.44
billion (RMB 1.746 billion).
o A 50:50 joint venture has been entered into by Japan’s Nissan Motor Co. and
the Dongfeng Motor Co. Dongfeng Nissan will set up a USD 362 million engine
plant in Guangzhou by early 2006 to produce 360,000 engines a year, and to
reduce production costs at their joint-venture car plant in Guangzhou. |
o US firm Warburg Pincus will pay USD 100 million for a 22.5% stake in Harbin
Pharmaceutical Group (Holdings), one of China’s largest drug manufacturers.
o To obtain funds for restructuring, Huabei Pharmaceutical Group has sold about
USD 24.12 million (about RMB 200 million) worth of shares in its listed
subsidiary to Dutch-based DSM, the world’s largest manufacturers of antibiotics.
o Vedan International (Holdings), the Vietnam-based and Taiwanese-backed
monosodium glutamate (MSG) and starch maker, has postponed the acquisition of an
MSG factory in Shanghai until the first quarter of this year because of land
zoning and land-use rights for the operation.
o Britain’s B & Q, one of the largest DIY superstores in Europe has agreed with
Pricemart to acquire five Pricemart stores, which may include those in Chongqing
and Chengdu.
o Gome Electrical Appliance, China’s largest home-appliance retailer, is trying
to acquire total control of the electrical retail network. The company recently
sought a 35 per cent stake in Beijing Gome Appliance, which it does not wholly
own.
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| Case Study: Conversion of a Failed State-owned Enterprise (SOE) to a Successful Wholly-owned Foreign Enterprise (WOFE) |
One of the American multinational company in question is
one of the largest food manufacturers in the world.
China's growing demand for quality traditional foods made it necessary for the
company to set up a network of manufacturing plants throughout China. Being
close to its consumer markets was important to help it overcome the traditional
problems of poor logistics and difficulty producing food products that catered
to local tastes. After the company purchased a failed Sate-owned
Enterprise (SOE) , which included its staff and assets, irregularities became
apparent in the latter's financial management, factory operations and
business-computer systems.
Our investigations revealed that senior Chinese executives were exerting
personal influence in the purchase of raw materials and choice of suppliers, and
that they were receiving additional and illegal salary compensation. In
addition, there was no control of business processes, and critical business data
concerning the cost and profit contribution of products were not known.
Also there were the inadequate control of computerized finance-systems
operations and deficiencies in the payment of Government taxes.
To overcome the above, our Consultant acted as an Interim Executive, took
control of the operation and remained on-site for several months to protect the
American owner's interests and bring about necessary improvements quickly.
We examined the cost and profitability of 250 products to determine which were
brand leaders, which were profitable and which products were adding little to
the company's profit. The product range was rationalized to improve profits and
simplify manufacturing planning, production and distribution. All manufacturing
processes were examined and documented to aid process rationalization and make
the operation transparent to expatriate executives. In addition, new
Chinese computer accounting systems were introduced to replace illegally copied
software and satisfy the reporting requirements of the PRC authorities and the
American company's head office reporting needs. This also supported the unique
American anti-fraud requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Other
improvements included financial transparency, improved warehousing and
distribution methods, a new staff compensation system and the introduction of a
foreign IT/ERP System for overall control of China operations. |
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